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Abstract—As the prevalence and everyday use of machine
learning algorithms, along with our reliance on these algorithms
grow dramatically, so do the efforts to attack and undermine
these algorithms with malicious intent, resulting in a growing
interest in adversarial machine learning. A number of approaches
have been developed that can render a machine learning algo-
rithm ineffective through poisoning or other types of attacks.
Most attack algorithms typically use sophisticated optimization
approaches, whose objective function is designed to cause max-
imum damage with respect to accuracy and performance of
the algorithm with respect to some task. In this effort, we
show that while such an objective function is indeed brutally
effective in causing maximum damage on an embedded feature
selection task, it often results in an attack mechanism that can be
easily detected with an embarrassingly simple novelty or outlier
detection algorithm. We then propose an equally simple yet
elegant solution by adding a regularization term to the attacker’s
objective function that penalizes outlying attack points.
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning (ML) algorithms are being applied to an
ever-growing spectrum of applications, with dramatic impact
of which the general public is largely unaware. Even a simple
task of ordering a book online involves machine learning at
multiple stages of the process: from the web search finding the
retailer [1], to advertisements shown alongside the results [2]
and recommended products on the website [3], fraud detection
from the payment provider [4], and to improving the efficiency
of the shipping / logistics [5]. Nontrivial matters are also
increasingly entrusted to ML algorithms, such as the justice
system determining who gets bail [6] and the Department of
Defense investigating their use in national security [7]. This
increased reliance on ML has vastly raised the sensitivity and
concerns towards a possible attack due to increased negative
impact of a potential vulnerability. The study of the security
of learning models at the intersection of ML and cybersecurity
is often referred to as adversarial machine learning [8].
The birth of adversarial machine learning (AML) is often
linked to the usage of statistical classifiers to classify spam
emails in the early 2000s [9]. Delvi et al. proposed a cost
based attack against Bayesian spam filters [10]. However,
Kearns’ 1993 work in computational learning theory studying
classification in the presence of malicious noise is, to the best
of our knowledge, the first work on machine learning in the
presence of an adversary [11]. More recently, the susceptibility
of deep learning models to adversarial examples [12] has
sparked increased interest in the field.
Barreno et al. introduced a taxonomy of adversarial machine
learning attacks to classify attacks along three axes: influence,
security violation, and specificity [13]. Influence describes the
mechanism by which the attacker operates: with causative
attacks (also known as poisoning attacks), the attacker has
control of the future training data; in contrast, exploratory at-
tacks (evasion attacks) only exploit misclassification. Security
violation describes the goal of the attacker: integrity attacks
attempt to allow malicious data to slip through (i.e., increase
the number of false negatives), while availability attacks seek
to allow non-malicious data to be classified as malicious (i.e.,
increase the number of false positives); privacy attacks attempt
to learn information about the classifier or dataset that should
not otherwise be available. In cybersecurity, availability attacks
are analogous to denial of service attacks. Specificity describes
the set of data that is affected: targeted attacks focus on a
small set of specific data, while indiscriminate attacks focus
on a large set of nonspecific data.
Attacks across the entire taxonomic spectrum have been
applied to a variety of algorithms and applications. For exam-
ple, poisoning attacks have been shown to be effective against
support vector machines [14] and modern deep learning al-
gorithms [15]. Evasion attacks have been applied to linear
SVM [16] and a significant body of work has been shown
for developing such attacks against deep learning models [17]
[18] [19]. Poisoning attacks have also been developed against
clustering algorithms [20], and have been shown to be effective
against feature selection algorithms [21].
In this work, we show that the common poisoning attacks
against embedded feature selection can be easily defeated
by novelty and outlier detection algorithms. To combat these
methods, we modify the attacker’s objective function in order
to explicitly control the inherent trade-off between the strength
of an attack point and the detectability of the attack, and we
evaluate the impact of this modification on multiple real-world
datasets. Finally, we discuss the importance of this work and
the trade-offs in designing secure systems.
II. POISONING ATTACKS
A. Notation
Following the notation used by Xiao et al. [21], we assume
that data are generated from a stationary, i.i.d. process p :
X 7→ Y (where X is the set of all possible input features and
Y is the set of all possible output values), from which a set
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D = {xi, yi}ni=1 is drawn, where each sample Di comprises
a d-dimensional feature vector xi = [x1i , ..., x
d
i ]
T ∈ X and a
target variable yi ∈ Y .
B. Attacker Knowledge
There are three levels of knowledge that an adversary may
have when developing an attack against a defender: perfect
knowledge, limited knowledge, and zero knowledge. Perfect
knowledge (also known as white-box) attacks occur when the
adversary knows everything about the model (the defender).
While this is often infeasible in practice, it is useful to study in
order to understand the worst-case scenario. Furthermore, in
cybersecurity, it has been demonstrated that security relying on
an adversary’s lack of knowledge, i.e., security by obscurity,
is ineffective [22]. Limited knowledge (or gray-box) attack
occurs when the adversary has some level of knowledge of
the model. Under this constraint, one approach is to construct
a surrogate dataset Dˆ = {xˆi, yˆi}mi=1, ideally drawn from
the same underlying distribution p from which D was drawn
[16]. This surrogate dataset can be used to train a surrogate
classifier that should be similar to the defender. Knowledge
of this surrogate classifier can be used when there is missing
knowledge of the defender. Zero knowledge (or black-box)
attacks occur when the adversary knows nothing about the
model prior to developing their attack.
C. Attack Strategy
Of various objectives that an adversary may have, such
as evading detection and taking advantage of the limitations
of the learning algorithm, or violating privacy and learning
something about the algorithm or data used to train the
algorithm, our focus in this work is on poisoning attacks
that add malicious data into the training dataset to poison the
algorithm.
Biggio et al. define the optimal attack strategy against a
learning algorithm as follows: given the knowledge θ that the
attacker knows about the learning model (described in Section
II-B), the attacker modifies some data A ∼ p according to
the attacker’s capabilities Φ in order to create a modified set
of data A′ ∈ Φ(A), known as the attack points [20]. The
theoretical effectiveness of the attack is then calculated using
some functionW(A′; θ). Therefore, the optimal attack strategy
is to maximize W subject to the adversary’s capabilities:
max
A′
W(A′;θ) (1)
s.t. A′ ∈ Φ(A)
While this generic strategy may generate attack points with
the maximal attack strength – and maximal damage to the clas-
sifier – a carelessly chosen function W can lead to the naı¨ve
generation of attack points that are easy to detect as outliers.
Such attack points are therefore ineffective against learning
systems that implement even the simplest of countermeasures.
III. POISONING ATTACKS AGAINST EMBEDDED FEATURE
SELECTION CAN BE EASILY DEFEATED
Xiao et al. proposed an attack strategy to generate a single
attack point xc against embedded feature selection algorithms
such as LASSO, ridge regression, and the elastic net, trying to
force them to choose a poor set of features, with the ultimate
goal of inflicting maximum classification loss on a linear
classifier f(x) = wTx + b trained with the features selected
by the aforementioned feature selection algorithms [21]. The
attacker objective is, therefore:
max
xc
W = 1
m
m∑
j=1
`(yˆj , f(xˆj)) + λΩ(w) (2)
where m is the number of instances, ` is the loss function
(typically, quadratic loss) that the classifier f seeks to min-
imize, λ is the regularization trade-off parameter, Ω(w) is
the regularization term (L1 for LASSO, L2 for Ridge, and a
weighted sum of L1 and L2 for Elastic Net), and f is learned
– by the attacker – by minimizing
min
w,b
L = 1
n
n∑
i=1
`(yˆi, f(xˆi)) + λΩ(w) (3)
on Dˆ ∪ {xc} (if the attacker has perfect knowledge of the
defender (i.e., not just the model but also the training data),
then it can operate directly on the true training data D, instead
of the the surrogate data Dˆ). This strategy is derived from the
optimal attack strategy in Equation 1, whereW is the objective
function of regularized linear regression. The resulting attack
algorithm computes the gradient of the attacker objective
(Equation 2) to yield:
∂W
∂xc
=
1
m
m∑
j=1
(f(xˆj)− yˆj)
(
xˆTj
∂w
∂xc
+
∂b
∂xc
)
+λr
∂w
∂xc
(4)
where r = ∂Ω∂w (r = sub(w) for LASSO, r = w for ridge,
and r = ρ sub(w) + (1 − ρ)w for elastic net. sub(w) is the
sub-gradient, equal to 1 for each positive element of w, -1 for
each negative element, and 0 for elements that are 0, and ρ
is the regularization trade-off term weighting the LASSO and
ridge regression terms in the elastic net.
The original gradient ascent algorithm used in [21] em-
ployed a line search to set the step size with a relative tolerance
stopping criteria, where the algorithm terminated once the
difference in W between two steps fell below some small
constant . For simplicity, we implement the gradient ascent
algorithm using a fixed step size σ, and run for a fixed number
of steps k. This modified algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
We note that as part of each gradient ascent step, the attack
algorithm alters the optimization direction such that the attack
point will remain within the feasible domain B in Step 5,
where ΠB(x) is the boundary projection operator that bounds
x onto the feasible domain B.
Given a surrogate dataset Dˆ (equivalent to D in case of
perfect knowledge), q attack points are randomly initialized.
Fig. 1. Poisoning LASSO regression where λ = 0.01. This figure is
based on our replication of Xiao et al.’s experiments to recreate Figure 1
in [21]. Red and blue points indicate the two classes. The solid red line
indicates the path that the attack point xc took during optimization, following
the attacker objective (left), with the star indicating the final attack point.
The attacker objective approximates the average classification error over 50
random initializations (right). With each random initialization, 50 instances are
sampled from the Gaussian distribution and the attack point pictured appended
to poison the dataset. LASSO regression is trained on this poisoned dataset
and the classification error is calculated. The border of the feasible domain
B is shown as a dashed line.
Algorithm 1 Poisoning Embedded Feature Selection using
Fixed Step Size
Require: Dˆ: surrogate training data
Require: {xt=0c , yc}qc=1: q initial attack points with labels
Require: σ: step size
Require: k: number of steps
1: for t = 1, . . . , k do
2: for c = 1, . . . , q do
3: {w, b} ← learn classifier on Dˆ ∪ {xt−1c }qc=1
4: Calculate ∇W according to Equation 4
5: d = ΠB
(
xt−1c +∇W
)− xt−1c
6: xtc = x
t−1
c + σd
7: end for
8: end for
9: return {xt=kc }qc=1
For each time step t and each attack point c, the algorithm (i.e.,
the attacker) first learns f by minimizing Equation 3, and uses
it to compute the attacker objective gradient as in Equation
4. Then, the gradient direction d is calculated by projecting
the sum of the attack point and the objective gradient into
the feasible domain B before subtracting the original attack
point vector. Finally, the updated attack point is calculated by
summing the original attack point vector with the product of
the gradient direction and the step size σ.
An example of this attack algorithm applied to a two-
dimensional Gaussian toy dataset is shown in Figure 1, for
which we implemented and replicated Xiao et al.’s experiment
in [21]. A careful observation of Figure 1 shows that the final
attack point lies on the border of the feasible space bounded
by ΠB – an arbitrary boundary set by the attacker with no
justification with respect to underlying application.
For some applications, the constraints on input features may
be well defined. For example, a pixel in an image has a clear
Attack
Strength
Attack instances
have little effect
Attack instances
have large effect
DetectabilityHard to detect
attack instances
Easy to detect
attack instances
Fig. 2. The attack strength-detectability continuum. A trade-off must be made
between the impact of the attack instances and how easy they are to detect.
boundary, and a limited range of color values. However, many
other problems have no clearly-set boundaries. For example,
a bag-of-words model for spam filtering, where each feature
is the count of each word, has no effective upper bound.
Additionally, because the attack points fall along the bound-
ary of the feasible space, the boundary itself plays a critical
role in both the effectiveness and detectability of the attack
points. If the boundary is set such that it remains well within
the convex hull of the dataset, the generated attack points can
blend in with legitimate data, and not be easily detectable as
malicious, but then the attack will have little impact on the
defender. If a wider boundary is used, well outside the convex
hull of the data, the attack can have a large negative impact
on the defender, but the data may be easily detectable as
malicious with a simple outlier detection. This attack strength
vs. detectability dilemma is illustrated in Figure 2.
IV. UPDATING THE ATTACK OBJECTIVE WITH AN
OUTLIER DETECTION EVASION TERM
We argue that the effectiveness of a poisoning attack drops
to zero if the poisoned data is easily detected and removed, and
that it is necessary to consider the detectability of an attack
point as well as the theoretical optimality of the poisoned data.
Therefore, in order to generate attack points that simultane-
ously maximize the impact the learner’s objective function and
minimize the defender’s capability for detection, we modify
the attack strategy in Equation 2 by adding a penalty term:
max
xc
W ′ =W − φΛ(xc) (5)
where Λ is a function of outlier detectability and φ is a
weighting term. The addition of this term modifies the gradient
of the attack strategy from Equation 4 to:
∂W ′
∂xc
=
∂W
∂xc
− φ ∂Λ
∂xc
(6)
Adding the Λ term to the attacker objective function allows
attack points to be generated anywhere along the attack
strength-versus-detectability continuum, shown in Figure 2,
depending on the outlier detection countermeasures used by
the defender.
Ideally, Λ should be selected to directly oppose the outlier
detection algorithm used by the defender; in practice, it is
very difficult or impossible to know precisely what defensive
methods a defender may be using. Therefore, it is necessary
to select a surrogate outlier detection algorithm against which
to optimize Λ. Here, we show the calculation of Λ against
Fig. 3. The attacker objective function of the modified attack using attacker
distance threshold of datt=1 on a 2D toy Gaussian dataset. The red star is the
final attack instance. When the distance from the attack instance to any other
instance is less than 1, the attacker objective function is identical to that of
the original attack. When the distance from the attack instance to any other
instance is greater than 1, the optimization stops. The white region corresponds
to D(xc,xk) > datt → Λ(xc) = ∞, and essentially determines the data-
driven boundary of the feasible space .
two possible surrogate outlier detection algorithms: distance
threshold and k-th nearest neighbor, chosen based on the
ease of gradient computation. If the defender is known to be
using a more sophisticated outlier detection algorithm, a more
complex gradient calculation may be needed.
A. Distance Threshold
The distance threshold method defines an outlier with
respect to the distance D between the attack point xc and
its nearest instance x′ in the dataset. The attacker, knowing or
suspecting that the defender may be using outlier detection,
chooses an attack threshold datt that is smaller than the
defender threshold ddef it thinks the defender is using. Then, if
the distance D is above the threshold datt, the attacker knows
that the attack point will be detected as an outlier. Hence, from
the attacker’s perspective, the Λ term can be defined as
Λ(xc) =
{
∞ D(xc,x′) > datt
0 otherwise
(7)
By this definition, the gradient calculation is identical to
Equation 4 when the distance D < datt. However, when the
attack point moves outside of the attacker distance threshold,
the penalty is set to infinity, preventing the algorithm from
continuing outside of the distance boundary. With this ap-
proach, the attack strength is controlled by varying the attacker
distance threshold parameter; hence datt effectively serves as
the outlier weight term φ. An example of an attack point
generated using this outlier term is shown in Figure 3. Note
that the attack point is now on a data-driven boundary (the
Fig. 4. The attacker objective function of the modified attack using the k-
nearest neighbor outliers term with φ = 0.005, P = 2, k = 3 on a 2D toy
Gaussian dataset. Due to the discontinuity of the objective function, the attack
instance becomes stuck in a local maximum.
edge of white regions), as opposed to user-defined one (outer
boundary shown as the dashed line as was the case in [21]).
B. k-th Nearest Neighbor
Another choice of outlier term is related to the distance to
the k-th nearest neighbor xk raised to some power.
Λ(xc) = ‖xc − xk‖P2 (8)
where xc is the attack point, xk is the k-th nearest point ∈ D,
and P is a user-defined parameter. The resulting gradient is
∂Λ
∂xc
= P · ‖xc − xk‖P−22 · (xc − xk) (9)
An example of an attack point generated using this outlier
term is shown in Figure 4. However, this term has a significant
drawback: the objective function becomes discontinuous due
to the abruptly changing k-th nearest neighbor, resulting in the
attack point often getting stuck in a local maximum. Because
of this tendency, we do not examine the case of assuming this
outlier detection method in our experiments.
V. EXPERIMENTAL METHODS AND RESULTS
A. Datasets
To evaluate the effectiveness of both the original attacks,
described in [21], and the proposed attacks augmented with
Λ, we attack LASSO regression trained on three UCI datasets:
spambase, credit approval, and congressional voting [23].
The spambase dataset contains both spam and non-spam
(i.e., ham) emails, where 48 features are the percentage of
words in the email that are a particular word (e.g., address,
free, business, etc.), six features are the percentage of char-
acters in the email that are a particular character (e.g., #, $,
!), one feature is the average length of uninterrupted capital
letters, one feature is the maximum length of uninterrupted
capital letters, and one feature is the sum of all uninterrupted
capital letter sequences. The feasible boundary of the first 54
features is [0, 100]; and is [0,∞] for the last three.
The credit approval dataset contains features about indi-
viduals that either were or were not granted credit from a
Japanese credit approval company. It contains 15 features:
6 are continuous, whose values range from 0 to 100,000; 9
are categorical, ranging from 2 to 14 categories. The exact
meaning of each feature is not stated and therefore the true
boundaries of the continuous input features are unknown;
however, at least one feature is related to the individual’s
income, which has no set upper bound.
The congressional voting dataset contains the voting
records of 435 members of the U.S. House of Representative in
1984. The 16 features are binary values that represent whether
they voted for or against a bill on certain topics (e.g., El
Salvador aid, religious groups in school, anti-satellite weapon
test ban, etc.). The objective is to predict the congressperson’s
political affiliation, either Democrat or Republican.
All features are normalized such that their mean is zero and
standard deviation is 1. 80% of the data is used as the training
dataset, while 20% reserved for testing.
B. Novelty and Outlier Detection Methods
For these experiments, the LASSO regression classifiers
trained on the UCI datasets were augmented with four novelty
and outlier detection algorithms: distance threshold, one-
class SVM, isolation forest, and local outlier factor, with
each algorithm being applied separately. We used our own
implementation of the distance threshold algorithm, while
the implementations of the one-class SVM, isolation forest,
and local outlier factor algorithms were obtained from the
scikit-learn library [24].
1) Distance Threshold: Distance threshold is the simplest
method of outlier detection: if the Euclidean distance between
a new instance xc and its nearest neighbor xi ∈ Dˆ is less than
some defender distance threshold ddef , then the new instance
is added to the dataset on which the classifier is trained;
otherwise, the new instance is considered an outlier and
discarded, and the dataset remains unchanged. It is important
to note that while they serve similar purposes, the defender
distance threshold ddef is different from the attacker distance
threshold datt: the defender distance threshold determines
the defender’s sensitivity to identifying data as outliers; the
attacker distance threshold determines the extent to which the
attack instances can be hidden from being detected as outliers.
2) One-Class SVM: One-class support vector machines act
as one-versus-all classifiers, drawing a classification boundary
between members of a specific class (legitimate data) and all
other data (i.e., poisoned attack data). To accomplish this,
the optimization function differs from the traditional two-class
SVM in that there is no opposing class data between which to
draw an optimal hyperplane; instead, the goal is to maximize
the distance between the classification hyperplane and the
origin in the appropriate high-dimensional feature space [25].
Any data point that lies inside of this hyperplane is considered
as a legitimate data point, and any data point that lies outside
of this hyperplane is considered an outlier.
3) Isolation Forest: Isolation forests seek to exploit the
fact that outlier data will generally exhibit two distinctive
properties: i.) they are the minority data, and ii.) they will
have features that are distinct from the clustered data [26].
By constructing a decision tree focused on isolating these
outlier points rather than categorizing normal data points,
the Isolation Tree can distinguish outliers by measuring the
depth of the leaf node containing each data point: outliers
will be categorized and isolated much closer to the root node
than the more clustered normal data. An Isolation Forest is
simply an ensemble of Isolation Trees, which achieves a higher
performance than a single tree alone.
4) Local Outlier Factor: Local outlier factor is defined as
the ratio between an instance’s density compared to the density
of the k-nearest neighbors. If an instance is an outlier, then the
local density is expected to be much lower than the density of
the k-nearest neighbors [27].
C. Experiment 1: Original Attack Performance Against Nov-
elty and Outlier Detection
The Experiment: For each training dataset, two attack in-
stances are generated using the original attack method de-
scribed in [21] using the same λ = 0.1. These two attack
instances are combined with 40 instances from the test dataset.
Outlier scores of the poisoned datasets are calculated using
the four novelty and outlier detection methods described in
Section III.
Results: Figure 5 shows the sorted outlier scores of the
poisoned dataset; the attack instances are shown in red, while
the legitimate instances from the test dataset are shown in blue.
In all experiments, at least one novelty or outlier detection
algorithm gave the attack instances the highest outlier scores,
with the isolation forest, distance threshold, and one-class
support vector machine giving the attack instances the highest
outlier score in all cases. This simple experiment shows that,
in a practical scenario, the original attack algorithm described
in [21] will generate attack instances that are easily identified
as outliers.
D. Experiment 2: Improved Attack Incorporating Novelty and
Outlier Detection Evasion
The Experiment: As in Experiment 1, two attack instances
are generated for each training dataset using the modified
attack method described in Section IV with the same λ = 0.1
however now with the attacker distance threshold parameter
datt set to 1. These two attack instances are combined with
40 instances from the test dataset. The outlier scores of the
poisoned datasets are calculated using the four novelty and
outlier detection methods described in Section III.
Results: Figure 6 shows the sorted outlier scores of the
poisoned dataset. In just about all cases, the attack points were
not given the highest outlier score. In fact, in most cases the
attack points received much smaller outlier scores, indicating
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Fig. 5. The sorted outlier scores of the attack instances generated by the
original attack algorithm in [21] (red) and 40 legitimate instances (blue) from
the spambase, congressional voting, and credit approval datasets. The outlier
scores are computed using the distance threshold, one-class SVM, local outlier
factor, and isolation forest novelty and outlier detection algorithms. For all
datasets, at least one of the novelty or outlier detection algorithms gave the
attack instances the highest outlier score.
that they likely would not have been detected and removed
as outliers. This experiment demonstrates that it is possible
to generate attack instances that can evade outlier detection
against classifiers trained on real-world datasets.
E. Experiment 3: Distance Threshold Based Countermeasures
on Toy Gaussian Dataset
The Experiment: While we have shown that the attack
instances from the original attack are easily identified as
outliers, and that the instances from the modified attack can
be created such that they are not identified as outliers, there is
a wide spectrum of attacks that can be chosen, with varying
attack strengths. From the attacker’s perspective, the goal is
to select the attack with the highest attack strength that is not
detected by any of the defender’s countermeasures; from the
defender’s perspective, the goal is to select a defense that will
block attack instances while still allowing legitimate data.
Using LASSO regression with λ = 0.1, we train three
classifiers on the toy Gaussian dataset from Figure 1, each
being augmented with a distance threshold outlier detector
with ddef set to 1, 3, or 5. As a control, we also train the
classifier using LASSO regression using no outlier detection.
Attack instances are generated using our improved attack
algorithm, with attacker distance thresholds varying between 0
and 10. At each such threshold, a poisoned dataset of 50 non-
malicious instances and 1 attack instance is generated. This is
repeated 50 times and the average classification accuracy on
the poisoned data is calculated for each defender.
Results: Figure 7 shows the average classification error vs.
attacker distance threshold on all four cases. With no counter-
measure (ddef = 0), the single attack point causes a significant
drop in accuracy from 96.1% to 87.8%; a remarkable drop
considering that the single attack point constitutes less than
2% of the augmented dataset. Adding outlier detection reduces
the negative impact of the attack instance: when the defender
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Fig. 6. The sorted outlier scores of the attack instances computed from the
modified attack algorithm, using a distance threshold outlier term with an
attacker distance threshold datt of 1 (red), injected into a set of 40 legitimate
instances (blue) from the spambase, congressional voting, and credit approval
datasets. The outlier scores are computed using the distance threshold, one-
class support vector machine, local outlier factor, and isolation forest. In most
cases, the attack instances were not given the highest outlier score and likely
would not have been labeled as outliers.
distance threshold is 1, 3, and 5, the accuracy drops only
to 94.1%, 94.2%, and 93.9%, respectively. As the attacker’s
outlier term is identical to the outlier detection mechanism
used by the defender (because the attacker has full or partial
knowledge of the defender), the distance thresholds chosen by
the attacker and defender are related. The relationship between
the two distance thresholds, and its effect on the classifier’s
performance, is worth noting: when the attacker threshold is
less than that of the defender, the attack instances are not
detected as outliers and have the maximum impact; when the
attacker threshold is greater than that of the defender, the
attack instances are detected and removed from the dataset,
and the attack is completely eliminated.
Using this modified attack, the attacker can select an appro-
priate threshold with respect to the countermeasures used by
the defender, based on whether the attacker has full or partial
knowledge of the defender (model). In this particular case, it
is advantageous for the defender to use an outlier detection
algorithm that is very sensitive to outliers (i.e., a low ddef ).
However, the improved outlier detection comes at the cost of
making the classifier less able to deal with drift or covariate
shift as any drift will also be detected as outliers.
F. Experiment 4: Impact of Attacker Distance Threshold on
Detectability
The Experiment: Using the datasets described in Section
V-A, we evaluate the impact of datt on detectability. For
each dataset-outlier detector pair, we generate attack instances
using the proposed attack mechanism with attacker distance
thresholds datt varying between 0 and 10. At each attacker
distance threshold, we calculate the outlier score, evaluated
on a poisoned dataset containing the legitimate test data
augmented with the appropriate attack instance.
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Fig. 7. The impact of applying a distance threshold based countermeasure
with varying defender distance thresholds (ddef = 1, 3, 5) to a LASSO
regression classifier (λ = 0.1) trained on a two-class Gaussian dataset. The
dataset is poisoned by adding a single attack instance to the dataset generated
using an attacker distance threshold between 0 and 10. The average accuracy
over 50 random runs is reported.
Results: Figure 8 shows that for every dataset-outlier de-
tector pair there is a clear trade-off between outlier score and
attack strength. Although a higher outlier score corresponds
to a greater impact on the defender’s loss, it also results in
a higher detectability, which could lead to zero impact if the
attack point is detected and removed.
VI. DISCUSSION
Using real datasets, we have shown that a clear trade-
off exists between the impact (i.e., damage) of an attack
instance and its detectability by novelty and outlier detection
techniques. While our experiments were on LASSO, there
is no reason to believe that this trend between impact and
detectability does not apply to other robust (stable) learners,
i.e. those that are less sensitive to perturbations and small
changes in their training data. For example, Biggio et al.
applied an evasion attack against a linear-kernel SVM trained
on the MNIST dataset, which, while effective, generated
attack images that were, visually and clearly, distinct from
a legitimate character, and hence easy to detect as malicious
[14]. This is a stark difference from the evasion attacks against
deep neural networks (relatively less robust classifiers) that
have been shown to be very difficult to detect [28].
The research into defending deep learning models can
be split into two primary approaches, detecting adversarial
examples and building robust classifiers [28]. While there
has been significant work into detecting adversarial examples
[29]–[31], they have had limited success. Much of the research
in defending deep learning models has gone into increasing
the robustness of the model though either adversarial training
[32]–[34] or defensive distillation [35], [36]. However, it has
been shown that even more robust machine learning algorithms
are still vulnerable to adversarial examples [14], [21]. In
this paper, we provide evidence that although more robust
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Fig. 8. Outlier score vs attacker distance threshold on the spambase, credit
approval, and congressional voting datasets using distance threshold (DT),
one-class support vector machines (1C-SVM), isolation forests (IF), and local
outlier factor (LOF). In general, as the attacker distance threshold increases,
the outlier score also increases and the attack instances are more easily
detected.
algorithms are still vulnerable to adversarial examples, the
adversarial examples are easier to detect.
In order to secure a machine learning system, one must both
have a robust model and some method of detecting adversarial
examples. If the model is not robust, it may be difficult
to detect adversarial examples. If the model is robust, one
must still detect and remove the adversarial examples. These
trends in the literature can be summarized by the detectability-
instability diagram in Figure 9.
Additionally, while adversarial machine learning is often
defined as the intersection between machine learning and
cybersecurity, very few connections have been made to cy-
bersecurity. A common tool used to secure networks is an
intrusion detection system that monitors network traffic for
malicious activity [37]; a similar tool does not presently
exist for machine learning systems, and techniques such as
novelty and outlier detection as well as other existing defense
techniques (e.g. reject on negative impact (RONI) [38]) should
be combined in order to create something analogous to the
cybersecurity intrusion detection systems.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we have shown that the attack proposed in [21]
can be easily defeated using outlier detection techniques. In
response, we have proposed a modified attack that allows the
attacker greater control over the strength of the attack in order
to evade these detection techniques. Our results show a clear
correlation between the attack strength and detectability of
adversarial attack instances when attacking LASSO regression
augmented with novelty and outlier detection.
Future work includes testing the improved attack algorithm
using more sophisticated outlier detection terms, testing dif-
ferent combinations of defender-outlier detection methods and
attacker outlier terms to better understand how much informa-
tion the attacker needs about the defenders countermeasures,
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Fig. 9. A conceptual representation of the impact of the robustness of
the model vs. the detectability of adversarial examples. Given two machine
learning models where one is a more robust learner, to generate an attack
with the same impact on the learner (i.e. attack strength), the attack against
the more robust learner will be easier to detect.
testing the use of multiple stages of countermeasures, and
creating a framework for combining multiple attacks in order
to poison black-box classifiers using existing perfect- and
limited-knowledge attacks.
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